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The West’s ‘overcapacity’ narrative is economically illiterate: Josef Gregory Mahoney_我的网站
A | 绷紧安全弦 奏响和谐曲 深圳市梅林一村幼儿园 2025年安全第一课 2025年安全第一课 安全教育是一幅细腻的画卷， 用规则的线条勾勒， 以常识的色彩填充， 描绘出生活中最安稳、最美好的模样。
In economics, overcapacity is a dynamic and relative concept. Supply-demand balance is temporary, and imbalance is the norm. The Western narrative that equates the sheer scale of China's production capacity directly with "overcapacity" is, frankly, economically illiterate. It conflates size with pathology.
Consider the math. China's manufacturing sector accounts for roughly 30 percent of global manufacturing value-added - a dominance unmatched since the post-war US. Yet this reflects not overcapacity but competitive capacity. The critics ignore that China's trade surplus in 2025 reached a record $1.2 trillion, roughly equivalent to the GDP of a top-20 economy like Saudi Arabia. They ignore that Chinese exports carry high import content - foreign value-added accounts for nearly half of gross export value - meaning China's capacity integrates global supply chains rather than displacing them.
The judgment lacks rigor because it applies a static snapshot to a dynamic system. It assumes that if China produces more than it currently consumes domestically, the surplus is automatically "overcapacity." Nonsense. By that logic, Germany's persistent trade surplus in automobiles and machinery would constitute chronic overcapacity. It does not, because German capacity serves global demand. So does China's. The narrative isn't economics. It's politics dressed in economic jargon.
Western critics attribute the price advantages of Chinese green technology products to "government subsidies" and "market distortion." This is a convenient story. It is also wrong. The global competitiveness of China's green technology industries stems from four interconnected factors: massive domestic market scale, decades of sustained infrastructure investment, a highly educated STEM workforce, and fierce intra-industry competition. China's NEV purchase-tax exemptions, extended through 2027, total approximately 520 billion yuan ($77.05 billion). Substantial? Yes. But causally linked to overcapacity? No.
The causal chain critics imagine - subsidies → artificial competitiveness → overproduction - collapses under scrutiny. The EU's IPCEI battery programs allocated over 6 billion euros, plus EIB financing. The US CHIPS Act appropriated $54.2 billion for semiconductors, while the Inflation Reduction Act funnels hundreds of billions into clean energy. All major economies subsidize strategic industries. The difference is that China converted subsidies into systemic efficiency: its nominal lithium-ion cell capacity reached approximately 2.2 TWh by end-2023, driving global average battery pack prices down 20 percent year-on-year to $115 per kilowatt-hour in 2024. That is not distortion. That's innovation at scale.
Chinese firms filed 20,081 European patent applications in 2024 - 10.1 percent of the total, with battery technology patents surging 79 percent year-on-year. Patents reflect innovation, not subsidy dependency. The causal link between subsidies and overcapacity is weak; the link between scale, innovation, and competitiveness is robust.
Meanwhile, global demand for green and low-carbon transition is experiencing explosive growth. The International Energy Agency projects that renewable capacity additions must triple by 2030 to meet Paris Agreement targets. In this context, labeling China's wind, photovoltaic, and battery capacity as "overcapacity" is not merely wrong - it is dangerously counterproductive.
In fact, China's capacity has played an indispensable role in advancing the global energy transition. Chinese solar module production costs have fallen roughly 90 percent over the past decade. Goldman Sachs Research notes that China manufactured approximately 86 percent of global solar modules, 80 percent of lithium-ion batteries, and 68 percent of electric vehicles in 2024. This is not overcapacity dumped on foreign markets; it is capacity the world desperately needs.
The "overcapacity" label assumes a zero-sum game where Chinese production crowds out others. The reality is synergistic: Chinese capacity lowers global clean energy costs, enabling faster deployment worldwide. The "overcapacity" label holds only if one believes the world should slow decarbonization to protect less competitive producers and to empower those that deliberately employ "burn, baby, burn" tactics. That's industrial protectionism intersecting with brown imperialism, and it's disproportionately impacting the Global South, which is more vulnerable to climate breakdown, precisely when it's finally trying to shake off centuries of systemic Western exploitation and suppression.
Furthermore, the disparity in how the West treats its own industrial policy versus China's is glaring. When the US funnels $52.7 billion through the CHIPS Act for semiconductors, or when the EU subsidizes Airbus, or when American agricultural subsidies distort global food markets, the silence from Western media is deafening. When China gains an edge in manufacturing, it faces media offensives and policy restrictions.
This is not inconsistency. This is strategy. The underlying motivation is the "China threat" rubric - a framework that treats China's development itself as a danger to the Western-led order. Countries wagging their fingers at China do so not because China violates economic rules they themselves follow, but because China succeeds under rules they once wrote to their own advantage.
These accusers possess their own national industrial policies and subsidies. They have long exploited historical and contemporary advantages against China and developing countries. They have not competed well, have not provided themselves with good governance, and have not invested adequately in their own infrastructure, education, and R&D. They have allowed their own leading industries to seek monopolistic positions detrimental not only to others but to their own consumers. Rather than reform themselves, they blame China.
In these contexts, the cry of "China Shock 2.0" is the latest iteration of an old playbook: frame China's development as a threat to global stability rather than a contribution to global progress. The claim that China's advances in renewable energy and AI will send more serious shock waves than traditional manufacturing displacement is analytically flawed and politically motivated.
First, the premise is false. China is not reducing the market share of developed countries through unfair means; it is outcompeting them through innovation, scale, and efficiency. According to Goldman Sachs Research, China's "new three" green technology sectors alone contributed around one percentage point to the country's 5.4 percent nominal export growth in 2025. This is competitive capacity serving global demand, not overcapacity dumped on foreign markets.
Second, the "shock" framing ignores history. China maintained production and trade flows in 2020 while major Western economies crashed, providing essential goods to global markets, likely saving millions of lives while mitigating what would have been greater global economic harm. The "shock" is not to the global economy; it is to Western complacency.
Third, the argument is self-contradictory. The critics want China to be simultaneously weak enough to dismiss and strong enough to fear. If China's high-tech development is genuinely formidable - so innovative and efficient that it threatens to displace developed economies - then it is delivering precisely the technological progress the world needs to meet climate goals. Restricting it through tariffs and barriers would harm global innovation, raise energy costs for developing countries, and slow decarbonization. The critics would be sacrificing the planet to protect their own complacency.
"China Shock 2.0" is a rhetorical device to justify protectionism. It replaces engagement with containment, competition with confrontation. The world does not need another shock doctrine. It needs cooperation, investment, and the recognition that China's rise is not a threat but an opportunity - for green transition, for technological progress, for shared prosperity, and for a shared future.
The author is a professor of politics and international relations and director of the Center for Ecological Civilization at East China Normal University in Shanghai. [email protected]
。 “居安思危，思则有备，有备无患。”安全教育是幼儿园永恒的主题。
B | 新学期伊始，深圳市梅林一村幼儿园以“意识为基，以防为先，筑安全感”为主题开展安全第一课活动，为孩子们的安全成长按下“启动键”。 主持人高燕副园长为本次活动拉开序幕：“安全是教育者的第一课，也是永恒的必修课。
C | ”她号召全体教职工凝聚共识，将安全意识深植于心，为孩子们筑起“看得见”与“看不见”的双重防护网。
D | 01 汇聚力量，共筑防诈防线 在当今数字化快速发展的时代，诈骗手段层出不穷，令人防不胜防。为有效提高幼儿园教职工的防范意识，保护大家的财产安全，幼儿园特别邀请了社区警务室的陈传江警官，举办了一场别开生面的防诈宣传讲座。陈传江警官以“诈骗手段千万变，防范意识不能断”为主题，用真实案例向大家展示当前诈骗案件的高发态势以及给人们带来的巨大损失，也为在场的每一个人都敲响了警钟：遇到骗局要坚持“三不原则”——不轻信、不透露、不转账，织密财产安全防护网。 SAFETY EDUCATION 02 精细部署，规划安全蓝图 随后，安全主任廖老师围绕“守初心、重演练、部门联动闭环管理、加强网络安全意识”等核心内容，为全体教职工带来一场干货满满的培训。
E | 1.守心砺炼——夯实安全根基 思想防线：将安全责任融入日常，严格落实《校园安全管理20条》，保持危机意识，师德师风与安全警觉并重。 应急能力：定期开展消防、防暴等演练，确保突发事件中快速响应；安全教育按月定主题（如春节安全），融入离园活动，形成共享教案。 家校沟通：与家长保持适度联系，平等对待幼儿，注重教师形象与舆情防范。 2. 部门联动——闭环管理无死角 “三个一”机制：每日一检查、每周一督察、每月一排查，多部门协作织密防护网。 重点规范：细化午睡巡查、户外活动站位分工、外出人数清点及电器管理；行政值班强化午睡、户外等时段监管。 3. 网络安全——警惕隐形风险 账号保护：谨慎使用网络，防止个人信息泄露。
F | 反诈防谣：不轻信陌生链接，警惕AI诈骗手段；对网络信息“不传谣、不信谣、不点不明内容”。 SAFETY EDUCATION 03 总结展望，明确工作方向 活动最后，盛园长对本次活动进行总结并指出：“安全是团队共赴的星辰大海，全体教职工应强化责任、强化执行、强化细节，树立安全意识，为新学期安全管理注入强心剂。” 每一份平安背后，都是责任与细节的交织；每一张童真的笑脸，都是我们坚守的意义。新学期，梅林一村幼儿园全体教职工将以“零隐患”的决心和“百分百”的行动力，让安全成为童年最美的底色。 ·安全小贴士· 定期检查园区设施， 隐患不过夜！ 急救技能常练习， 关键时刻能救命！ 反诈知识勤更新， 守护集体“钱袋子”！ SAFETY EDUCATION 文字 | 李世龙 编辑 | 周锐 初审 | 杨鑫 孟雪颍 终审 | 盛虹瑾。
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